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NOTE
Omnipresent Chemicals: TSCA Preemption in
the Wake of PFAS Contamination
FREDERICK A. MCDONALD
Over the past few decades, studies addressing the harms of
PFAS have gradually progressed, and now scientists believe
increased exposure could lead to reproductive defects and a higher
risk of cancer. Given the amplified concern surrounding these
pervasive chemicals, states are proactively filing lawsuits on
behalf of their citizens and enacting legislation to combat this
nation-wide contamination epidemic. However, given the 2016
Amendment to the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, states
looking to regulate the manufacturing or looking to ratify a statewide ban on the manufacturing of such chemicals may face
preemption under actions taken by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency.
This Note focuses on the possible loss of state autonomy
with regards to PFAS regulation. It addresses the issues states
might face given the restrictive nature of the newly enacted
preemption provisions of the Toxic Substances Control Act, while
also examining the Act’s possible deficiencies. Ultimately,
recognizing a need for creative solutions outside the scope of
manufacturing regulations may provide the best solutions for
states to combat these ubiquitous chemicals.

 J.D. Candidate and Productions Editor, Pace Environmental Law Review,
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University, 2020; B.S., The College of New
Jersey (TCNJ), 2016. Winner of the NYSBA 2019 William R. Ginsburg Memorial
Essay Contest. The author would like to thank Professor Katrina Fischer Kuh for
assisting in the formulation of this Note topic, and Professor Bridget J. Crawford
for her invaluable edits. The author would also like to thank the Pace
Environmental Law Review editors and associates for their work on this Note.
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INTRODUCTION

We stand now where two roads diverge. But unlike the roads in
Robert Frost’s familiar poem, they are not equally fair. The road
we have long been traveling is deceptively easy, a smooth
superhighway on which we progress with great speed, but at its
end lies disaster. The other fork of the road — the one “less
traveled by” — offers our last, our only chance to reach a
destination that assures the preservation of the earth.1

These words, immortalized in the mid-twentieth century to
address the indiscriminate use of pesticides, ideologically correlate
to another class of harmful chemicals known as PFAS. 2 While
concern was surrounding pesticides in the 1900s, PFAS began
lurking in the shadows of large corporations, slowly proliferating
into what eventually would be referred to as a nation-wide
contamination epidemic. Though still shrouded in some mystery,
PFAS are no longer hidden from society and have been brought to
the fore as a result of scientific evidence linking increased chemical
exposure to negative health consequences. As such, states are
making strides to regulate these pervasive chemicals, but face a
potential obstacle: federal preemption.
While preemption has various meanings, the modern legal
usage refers to the federal government’s constitutional right to
invalidate state law.3 Rooted in the Supremacy Clause, Article VI
of the United States Constitution, preemption establishes that
federal law is the “supreme Law of the Land”4—meaning, states

1. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 277 (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1987)
(1962).
2. Perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances (collectively known as
PFAS) are a family of synthetic compounds not found naturally in the
environment. The commonality among these human-made compounds is the
multiple fluorine atoms. See Scott Fulton et al., The Use of PFAS at Industrial
and Military Facilities: Technical, Regulatory, and Legal Issues, 49 ENVTL. L. REV.
10109, 10111 (2019); see also AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCE & DISEASE REGISTRY,
AN OVERVIEW OF PERFLUOROALKYL AND POLYFLUOROALKYL SUBSTANCES AND
INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR CLINICIANS RESPONDING TO PATIENT EXPOSURE CONCERNS
(2018).
3. Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Introduction: Preemption in
Context, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 1, 1
(Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007).
4. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
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are bound by federal decrees. A common concern surrounding such
notion has been states’ loss of autonomy.5 In other words, once the
federal government decides to regulate a certain area of law, states
are typically not permitted to impose contradictory directives.
Because of this sovereignty issue, “[t]here is a presumption against
preemption in areas historically regulated by the states.”6
While some areas of law have been traditionally regulated by
the states, such as the environmental field,7 not all federal statutes
supersede state law, and thus, federal and state standards might
have the capability to operate in the same province.8 In the context
of environmental statutes, Congress has executed many uniform
regulations since the 1970s, but has left some flexibility to the
states to implement additional regulations in ways that reflect
local particularities.9 For example, the Toxic Substances Control
Act of 1976 (“TSCA”), for many years, allowed states to enact
various laws regarding harmful chemicals as a result of the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) facing
difficulties regulating under TSCA’s principal provision.10
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). The
Supreme Court has addressed and provided various interpretations on the
Supremacy Clause throughout history. See N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244
U.S. 147, 169 (1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (illustrating an early example of
field preemption); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 630–34 (1982)
(discussing how courts must balance conflicts between federal and state statutes
when Congress has not explicitly placed prohibitions on states); Gibbons v. Ogdon,
22 U.S. 1 (1824).
5. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420 (2003) (“[I]t would
be reasonable to consider the strength of the state interest, judged by standards
of traditional practice, when deciding how serious a conflict must be shown before
declaring the state law preempted.”).
6. Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A
Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 252 (2000).
7. See generally Sandra Zellmer, Federal Pre-Emption and Displacement of
Environmental Statutes and Common Law Claims, in DECISION MAKING IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 96, 102 (LeRoy C. Paddock et al. eds., 2016).
8. Id. at 98.
9. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Comparing the 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act to
the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, ENVTL. DEF.
FUND 8 (June 22, 2016), http://blogs.edf.org/health/files/2016/06/Side-by-sideoldTSCA-newTSCA-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2AH-Z4VM].
10. Mark N. Duvall et al., What’s New About the Revised TSCA – Toxic
Substance
Control
Act,
NAT’L
L.
REV.
(June
2,
2016),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/what-s-new-about-revised-tsca-toxic-
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However, under the 2016 Amendment to TSCA, states now face
strict preemption provisions which could drastically affect efforts
to regulate certain chemicals under existing and future state law.11
This Note argues that states might be partially preempted
from regulating PFAS under TSCA, and therefore, should focus on
implementing corrective solutions, outside the scope of
manufacturing regulations, in order to overcome preemption. A
special emphasis will be placed on state and federal regulations
surrounding
perfluorooctanoic
acid
(“PFOA”)
and
perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (“PFOS”), the most commonly known
PFAS.12 Part II reviews the historical background and scientific
properties of PFAS, examining specifically PFOA and PFOS, and
will address why these chemicals are of concern to states. Part III
(1) provides a general overview of TSCA prior to the 2016
Amendment, (2) an overview of the new preemption provisions
after its Amendment, and (3) an examination of whether the
amended preemption provisions could result in a revival of the
nondelegation doctrine. Part IV examines the EPA’s efforts to
combat PFAS and whether the states might be in a period of
preemption. Part V compares existing state measures regarding
PFAS. Part VI examines (1) possible methods to avoid preemption,
(2) alternatives to TSCA’s exceptions provision, and (3) other
means to regulate PFAS while still complying with TSCA.
II.

OVERVIEW OF PFAS THROUGH A
HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF PFOA AND
PFOS, THE MOST COMMONLY RECOGNIZED
PFAS

A. Scientific Properties and Historical Perspective
PFAS incorporate a large quantity of different chemicals used
for industrial purposes. From a technical standpoint, such group of
chemicals have been described as “a diverse class . . . characterised
substances-control-act [https://perma.cc/93KP-LZDF] (noting that “EPA has
regarded TSCA’s principal control provision. . .as unworkable”).
11. See Kalyn Behnke, Toxic Preemption: Why the Lautenberg Chemical
Safety Act’s Erosion of State Authority Contaminates Environmental Law, 57
JURIMETRICS J. 459, 460 (2017).
12. PFAS Contamination of Water, STATE OF RHODE ISLAND DEP’T OF HEALTH,
http://www.health.ri.gov/water/about/pfas/ [https://perma.cc/DK49-L7ZW].
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by a hydrophobic alkylated chain saturated with fluorine atoms,
usually attached to a hydrophilic head.”13 More simply, the
structure of PFAS, which has lipid properties and water-resistant
properties, makes these substances ideal for commercial uses.14 Of
the thousands of PFAS in existence, PFOA and PFOS are the two
most well-known types, which materialized back in the midtwentieth century.15
PFOA is a synthetic compound with a chain length of eight
carbons and hence, is often referred to as “C8.”16 The chemical “is
used in the form of salts in the production of fluoropolymers, which
have special properties in manufacturing and industrial
applications, such as fire resistance, and oil, stain, grease, and
water repellence.”17 PFOA is most commonly associated with
Teflon,18 another name for the human-made chemical PTFE.19
Known for its stability, Teflon has most commonly been used in
pans and other cookware because of its non-stick coating
capabilities.20 Teflon does not contain PFOA, but rather, PFOA is
used to make Teflon and is a byproduct of Teflon production.21
PFOS is fairly similar to PFOA in that both chemicals contain
eight carbons.22 The chemical is produced synthetically from
13. M. Clara et al., Emissions of Perfluorinated Alkylated Substances (PFAS)
from Point Sources—Identification of Relevant Branches, 58 WATER SCI. & TECH.
59, 59 (2008).
14. Id.
15. See INTERSTATE TECH. REGULATORY COUNCIL, HISTORY AND USE OF PERAND POLYFLUOROALKYL SUBSTANCES (PFAS) 1 (Nov. 2017), https://pfas1.itrcweb.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/pfas_fact_sheet_history_and_use__11_13_17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q5F9-U7XE]. PFOA and PFOS are just two of roughly 3,000
chemicals part of the PFAS family. Id.
16. NICHOLAS
P.
CHEREMISINOFF,
PERFLUORINATED
CHEMICALS:
CONTAMINANTS OF CONCERN 49–50 (2017).
17. Id. at 50. Some of the common industrial sectors that use PFOA include
aerospace, automotive, building/construction, chemical processing, electronics,
semiconductors, and textile industries. Id.
18. CALLIE LYONS, STAIN-RESISTANT, NONSTICK, WATERPROOF, AND LETHAL:
THE HIDDEN DANGERS OF C8 2 (2007).
19. Teflon and Perfluorooctanoic Acid (PFOA), AM. CANCER SOC’Y (Jan. 5,
2016), https://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancer-causes/teflon-and-perfluorooctanoicacid-pfoa.html [https://perma.cc/C9T2-JZ4T].
20. Id.; see also LYONS, supra note 18, at 1 (Teflon is used in household
cleaning products and beauty items).
21. AM. CANCER SOC’Y, supra note 19.
22. See CHEREMISINOFF, supra note 16, at 44.
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perfluorooctane sulfonyl fluoride (“PFOSF”), which is used for
production of C8 compounds.23 PFOS substances have been
manufactured for roughly five decades, and their unique properties
are ideal for manufactured products such as firefighting foams 24
and surface resistance or repellence to oils, water, and grease.25
Factors contributing to PFAS contamination began as early as
1938 when Dr. Roy J. Plunkett, a research chemist, accidentally
stumbled onto what is often referred to as “the miracle of Teflon.”26
The discovery was made during the early stages of Dr. Plunkett’s
work with DuPont, an American conglomerate responsible for the
development of numerous polymers throughout the twentieth
century.27 For years, and in order to produce Teflon, DuPont
purchased PFOA from 3M, which had been the main corporation
manufacturing the chemical since the 1940s.28
Around the same time that PFOA was making its way into the
manufacturing process of various Teflon related products, PFOS
became a key ingredient in stain repellants, such as Scotchgard.29
Similar to Dr. Plunkett’s accidental discovery, Patsy Sherman, a
chemist for 3M, developed Scotchgard while trying to create a

23. Id.
24. Stephen H. Korzeniowski et al., Fluorosurfactants in Firefighting Foams:
Past and Present, in PERFLUOROALKYL SUBSTANCES IN THE ENVIRONMENT: THEORY,
PRACTICE, AND INNOVATION 3, 13 (David M. Kempisty et al. eds., 2019) (noting that
fluorosurfactants [another name for PFAS] were used as firefighting foam
agents).
25. Kavitha Dasu et al., Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substance Analysis to
Support Site Characterization, Exposure, and Risk Management, in
PERFLUOROALKYL SUBSTANCES IN THE ENVIRONMENT: THEORY, PRACTICE,
INNOVATION, supra note 24, at 40.
26. LYONS, supra note 18, at 1.
27. Roy J. Plunkett, Historical Biographies, SCI. HISTORY INST. (Dec. 14,
2017),
https://www.sciencehistory.org/historical-profile/roy-j-plunkett
[https://perma.cc/ZYF8-9AMX].
28. Sharon Lerner, 3M Knew About the Dangers of PFOA and PFOS Decades
Ago, Internal Documents Show, THE INTERCEPT (July 31, 2018, 12:33 PM),
https://theintercept.com/2018/07/31/3m-pfas-minnesota-pfoa-pfos/
[https://perma.cc/HR5C-JTPZ].
29. See Jonathon W. Martin et al., PFOS and PreFOS? Are Perfluorooctane
Sulfonate Precursors (PreFOS) Important Determinants of Human and
Environmental Perfluorooctane Sulfonate (PFOS) Exposure?, 12 J. ENVTL.
MONITORING 1979, 1982 (2010).
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rubber that would not deteriorate from exposures to jet fuel. 30
Sherman’s discovery lead to the first manufactured Scotchgard
product, which contained PFOS. 31
B. States continued concern over PFOA and PFOS
Chemicals, and why regulation of additional PFAS
is desired
Studies have shown that while DuPont and 3M continued to
reap the benefits of their products that contained or used various
PFAS, both companies began to accumulate information on the
hazardous effects surrounding PFOA and PFOS.32 Discovery of
dangerous consequences from exposure to these chemicals began
as early as the 1960s, finding that animals experienced adverse
effects to PFOA and PFOS. 33 By the 1970s, such chemicals were
found to be present in the blood of 3M and DuPont workers. 34 The
most alarming realization, given the unknown consequences of
human exposure at the time, was the presence of these chemicals
in the blood of nearly every worker in facilities manufacturing
PFAS.35 As the years progressed, studies from these corporations
showed that not only were company workers plagued with
exposure to these chemicals, but animals, not tested in labs, had
traces of the compounds in their blood as well. 36 It became clear
that PFAS were infecting surrounding environments (e.g., water
and air) and was not contained solely to the factories producing the
chemicals.37

30. Susan Borowski, Scientific Breakthroughs that Were Accidents, AM. ASS’N
THE
ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., 3P2Yhttps://www.aaas.org/scientificbreakthroughs-were-accidents [https://perma.cc/9CVW-3P2Y].
31. Id.
32. Poisoned Legacy: From Lab Accident to Global Pollutant, ENVTL.
WORKING GRP. (May 1, 2015), https://www.ewg.org/research/poisoned-legacy/labaccident-global-pollutant [https://perma.cc/P2DN-NBTL].
33. Id.; see also LYONS, supra note 18, at 4 (studies have shown that animals
exposed to PFOA developed a variety of cancers, including liver, pancreas, breast,
and testicular).
34. ENVTL. WORKING GROUP, supra note 32; see generally THE DEVIL WE KNOW
(Netflix 2018) (recounting how PFAS infected a West Virginia community and
individuals working in 3M and DuPont factories).
35. ENVTL. WORKING GROUP, supra note 32.
36. Id.
37. Id.
FOR
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While some PFAS are no longer manufactured in the United
States today, such as PFOA and PFOS, states still have an
increasing concern over the health effects and environmental
impacts caused from years of exposure.38 PFAS are ubiquitous in
the environment and human body, do not break down easily, and
can accumulate over time.39 Specifically, these substances are
found in the air, soil, and water.40 While the chemical break down
is quicker in the air, PFAS do not break down at all once it enters
the water and soil.41
Individuals face exposure to PFAS through the air breathed
and sometimes indoor contact from dust and household products.42
The most common form of exposure comes from eating food and
drinking water which contain these chemicals.43 While scientific
studies continue, it is believed that PFAS may “affect growth,
learning, and behavior of infants and older children, lower a
woman’s chance of getting pregnant, interfere with the body’s
natural hormones, increase cholesterol levels, affect the immune
system, [and] increase the risk of cancer.”44 Interestingly enough,
individuals throughout the world face these potential health risks,
as studies show that nearly everyone has traces of the chemicals
in their blood.45
Because of the continued concern over PFAS, states are taking
two forms of action. The first involves numerous states filing
lawsuits against manufacturers of PFAS, such as DuPont and

38. See Basic Information on PFAS, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/pfas/basicinformation-pfas [https://perma.cc/W7NN-NN3L].
39. Id.
40. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, PER- AND
POLYFLUOROALKYL SUBSTANCES (PFAS): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2018),
https://www.health.ny.gov/environmental/investigations/drinkingwaterresponse/
docs/atsdr_pfas_factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/FMU2-AXCF].
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) and Your Health: PFAS
Health Effects, AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY (Jan. 10,
2018), https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/pfas/health-effects.html [https://perma.cc/AS4SEZ3K]; see also CHEREMISINOFF, supra note 16, at 66, 77.
45. AM. CANCER SOC’Y, supra note 19; see THE DEVIL WE KNOW, supra note 34
at 21:58–22:14.
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3M.46 In particular, Minnesota47 and New York48 are two states
asserting actions on behalf of their citizens, with Minnesota
achieving a multimillion-dollar settlement. Many consider these
chemicals to be the “next PCB” because of the bioaccumulation
affects and the realization that such chemicals will not leave the
body.49 As a result, it is no surprise that litigation is being used as
a remedial mechanism that will likely continue for many years to
come.50
The second curative approach to the epidemic involves states
enacting laws and promulgating regulations to ban
manufacturing.51 While states have a right to be concerned over
these chemicals and hope to implement effective laws and
regulations, the new provisions under TSCA might preempt such
efforts.52 As a result, states must examine TSCA closely to
determine whether a continuance or the establishment of certain
statutes are viable options.53
46. See Matthew Thurlow et al., PFAS Contamination Remains a Hot-Button
Issue: Overview of Recent Regulatory, Litigation, and Technical Developments, 19
ENVTL. LITIG. & TOXIC TORTS COMM. NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Env’t.,
Energy & Res., Chicago, IL), Apr. 2018, at 19, 21.
47. See generally Amended Complaint at 1, State of Minnesota v. 3M Co., No.
27-CV-10-28862 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 19, 2011) (complaint sought damages under
MERLA, damages under MWPCA, damages for trespass, damages for common
law nuisance, damages for statutory nuisance, and damages for negligence). This
case settled for $850 million and the money will be used to finance projects that
involve drinking water and water sustainability. See Tiffany Kary, 3M Settles
Minnesota Lawsuit for $850 Million, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 20, 2018, 3:53 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-20/3m-is-said-to-settleminnesota-lawsuit-for-up-to-1-billion [https://perma.cc/F366-4J74].
48. See generally Complaint at 1, State of New York v. 3M Co., No. 90402918 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 19, 2018) (complaint asserts cause of action for public
nuisance, strict products liability for defective design, and strict products liability
for failure to warn, in addition to a restitution claim).
49. Tiffany Kary, To the EPA, ‘Forever Chemicals’ Are a Big Problem Now,
WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/to-theepa-forever-chemicals-are-a-big-problem-now/2019/02/13/d9a75104-2f64-11e98781-763619f12cb4_story.html [https://perma.cc/SSS7-W4WF].
50. Individuals are also bringing private actions against manufacturers of
PFAS. See id.
51. Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS): State Legislation 20172018, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF ST. LEGISLATURES (June 29, 2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-natural-resources/per-andpolyfluoroalkyl-substances-pfas-state-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/LAW2-9W24].
52. Behnke, supra note 11, at 466–67.
53. Id. at 467.
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OVERVIEW OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES
CONTROL ACT

A. The Toxic Substances and Control Act of 1976
Congress adopted TSCA in 1976 in order to “prevent
unreasonable risks of injury to health or the environment
associated with manufacture, processing, distribution in
commerce, use, or disposal of chemical substances.”54 “TSCA
promised to: (1) create an inventory of existing chemicals and
require the premanufacture review of any chemical not included
on this inventory; (2) require chemical manufacturers and
processors to develop data on the health and environmental effects
of their chemicals; and (3) restrict or require labeling on chemicals
that present unreasonable risks.”55 Proponents of TSCA believed
that the statute would avoid the need for further federal
regulations.56 However, many scholars criticized TSCA for years,
claiming that the EPA was unable to effectively utilize the statute
for Congress’ intended purpose.57
Scholars identified three predominant gaps in U.S. chemical
policy, resulting from TSCA’s weaknesses: a (1) data gap, (2) safety
gap, and (3) technology gap.58 The alleged data gap was a product
of not requiring producers to examine and divulge information on
hazardous traits of chemicals to the government, public, or

54. S. REP. NO. 94-698, at 1 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491,
4491; see also David Markell, An Overview of TSCA, Its History and Key
Underlying Assumptions, and Its Place in Environmental Regulation, 32 WASH.
U. J. L. & POL’Y 333, 338 (2010) (noting the purpose of the original TSCA
enactment).
55. Jessica N. Schifano et al., The Importance of Implementation in
Rethinking Chemicals Management Policies: The Toxic Substances Control Act,
41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10527, 10528 (2011).
56. 1977 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY ANN. REP. 1, 347.
57. Michael P. Wilson & Megan R. Schwarzman, Toward a New U.S.
Chemicals Policy: Rebuilding the Foundation to Advance New Science, Green
Chemistry, and Environmental Health, 117 ENVTL. L. HEALTH PERSP. 1202, 1202
(2009) (claiming the statute has “prevented government, businesses, and the
public from a) assessing the hazard traits of the great majority of chemicals in
commerce; b) controlling chemicals of significant concern; and c) motivating broad
industry investment in cleaner chemical technologies and safer alternatives,
known collectively as green chemistry.”).
58. Id.
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businesses that used said chemicals.59 This gap illustrates how
companies, such as 3M and DuPont, avoided liability for their
injection of PFAS into the environment for years. Distinguishably,
the safety gap was premised on the idea that the EPA lacked legal
tools to “identify, prioritize, and take action to mitigate potential
health and environmental effects of hazardous chemicals.”60
Finally, the supposed technology gap relied on the notion that the
government did not invest sufficiently in research, development,
and education.61 Because of these gaps and the EPA’s inability to
review safety components, hundreds of dangerous chemicals
entered the market.62
Another believed contributing factor to the original TSCA’s
failure was the landmark asbestos decision, Corrosion Proof
Fittings v. EPA.63 Beginning in 1979, the EPA reviewed hundreds
of asbestos studies and conducted public meetings, resulting in an
asbestos ban.64 The Fifth Circuit ultimately vacated the asbestos
ban promulgated by the EPA on both procedural and substantive
grounds.65 Procedurally, the court concluded that the EPA failed
to give the public sufficient notice.66 Generally speaking, the EPA
was required to “give notice as to its intended methodology while
the public still has opportunity to analyze, comment, and influence
the proceedings.”67 Substantively, the court concluded that the
EPA failed to abide by TSCA’s less burdensome alternatives for
addressing unreasonable risks, failed to determine alternatives to
a complete ban, and failed to assess risks with potential
substitutes.68 Because of the Fifth Circuit’s holding, legal
commentators have viewed the original TSCA as imposing
particularly high evidentiary hurdles for EPA regulators to

59. Id. The data gap prevented the EPA from instituting more than
voluntary measures to act on early indicators of harm. Id. at 1202–04.
60. Id. at 1202.
61. Id.
62. A New Chemical Safety Law: The Lautenberg Act, ENVTL. DEF. FUND,
https://www.edf.org/health/policy/chemicals-policy-reform
[https://perma.cc/E2SJ-HPKY].
63. 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
64. Id. at 1207.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1212.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1229–30.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/4

12

2019]

OMNIPRESENT CHEMICALS

151

overcome.69 Some commentators have gone as far as saying that
the decision inflicted the most damage to the EPA’s ability to
regulate chemical substances.70 With the court’s remand of the
asbestos ban, there seemed to be an assumption that the EPA
might want to avoid rulemaking altogether in order to prevent
another debacle like the asbestos ban.71
Although intended to create a healthier, safer environment for
society, the original TSCA failed for numerous reasons. As such,
Congress implemented a supposedly more effective act to correct
these statutory weaknesses.72
B. The Toxic Substances and Control Act Amendment:
Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st
Century Act
In 2016, Congress enacted the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical
Safety for the 21st Century Act (“LCSA”), an amendment to the
Toxic Substances and Control Act of 1976.73 At its core, the
Amendment was in response to TSCA being “woefully out of step
with the best and latest science relating chemical exposures to
human health.”74 A driving motivation for the Amendment was to
alleviate the EPA from a classic catch-22 situation, where the strict

69. LINDA-JO SCHIEROW, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34118, THE TOXIC
SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (TSCA): IMPLEMENTATION AND NEW CHALLENGES 17
(2009).
70. Robert B. Haemer, Reform of the Toxic Substances Control Act: Achieving
Balance in the Regulation of Toxic Substances, 6 ENVTL. L. 102, 116 (1999).
71. Id. at 118. (“The fact that the court found ten years of rulemaking and a
45,000 page record inadequate to support a ban on asbestos makes it appear that
EPA management has good reason to avoid rulemaking altogether.”); see also
Mark A. Greenwood, TSCA Reform: Building a Program that Can Work, 39
ENVTL. L. REP. 10034, 10034 (2009) (“In the early 1990s, when the courts rejected
EPA’s comprehensive ban on asbestos, TSCA became widely known as a ‘broken’
statute.”).
72. See Behnke, supra note 11, at 464.
73. See The Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act: A
More Effective Way to Regulate Chemicals in Commerce, AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL,
https://www.americanchemistry.com/LCSA-LearnMore.pdf[https://perma.cc/8ALU-5TW8].
74. Richard A. Denison, A Primer on the New Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA) and What Led to It, ENVTL. DEF. FUND 1 (Apr. 2017),
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/denison-primer-on-lautenberg-act.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JXD2-EZ65].
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standards of the original TSCA led to the testing of only a few
hundred chemicals.75
Among the major revisions from LSCA is Section 18, which
addresses preemption over state law. 76 Prior to the amendment,
though legally feasible, the original TSCA did not often trigger
preemption.77 Now, preemption under LSCA has sparked major
debate over whether it is too strict and ultimately prevents state
autonomy given the abundance of state regulations. 78
The revised Section 18 sets forth all-purpose conditions for
which states and political sectors are not permitted to establish or
continue the enforcement of statutes, administrative actions, or
criminal penalties.79 LSCA provides that states can no longer
establish or enforce the following: (1) development of
information,80 (2) chemical substances found not to present an
unreasonable risk or restriction,81 and (3) significant new use.82
Broadly speaking, LSCA restrictions preclude state effort when the
EPA proclaims a new rule that addresses identified risks posed by
a chemical or determines, through a risk evaluation, that certain
chemicals do not pose an unreasonable risk to the public.83
Additionally, such preemptive conditions do not occur until the
“effective date of the applicable action described. . .by the
Administrator.”84 However, if the EPA has failed to address a new

75. Id. at 3.
76. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2617 (2018).
77. See, e.g., Hudson Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 138 F.
Supp. 2d 482, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that TSCA did not apply, but
nonetheless, detailed the isolated instances when preemption would be triggered).
78. See generally LISA R. BURCHI, Section 18 – State-Federal Relationship, in
NEW TSCA: A GUIDE TO THE LAUTENBERG CHEMICAL SAFETY ACT AND ITS
IMPLEMENTATION 207, 207 (Lynn L. Bergeson & Charles M. Auer eds., 2017); see
also Charles Franklin et al., Pesticides, Chemical Regulation, And Right-ToKnow, in ABA ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY, & RESOURCES LAW: THE YEAR IN REVIEW
2016 74, 76 (ABA Env’t, Energy, & Res., 2016).
79. See BURCHI, supra note 78, at 207–08.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A).
81. Id. at § 2617(a)(1)(B).
82. Id. at § 2617(a)(1)(C).
83. Id. at § 2617(a)(1).
84. Id. at § 2617(a)(2) (a section 6 determination will need to be made). An
example of this is “when a Section 4 rule is issued in final, not when it is
proposed.” BURCHI, supra note 78, at 208.
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chemical, states are not preempted unless, or until, the EPA takes
the chemical under its existing authority.85
In addition to the three categories of preemptive measures
listed above, Section 18 also hinders state effort through what is
referred to as “pause preemption.”86 Unlike other preemption
provisions, pause preemption might only be temporary.87 This
timing condition mandates when statutes, criminal penalties, or
administrative actions cannot be enacted by states or political
subdivisions.88 Simply put, under 15 U.S.C. § 2617(b), no actions
regarding a chemical may be established, “once the EPA defines
the scope of a risk evaluation . . . and until the earlier of either: (1)
the dead-line established under [15 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(4)(G)] for
completion of the risk evaluation expires or (2) the date on which
the EPA publishes the risk evaluation under TSCA [15 U.S.C.
§ 2605(b)(4)(C)].”89 This provision is referred to as pause
preemption because it provides a time frame for when states are
preempted from acting.90 It does not, however, prohibit state action
while the EPA deliberates over whether a chemical might pose an
unreasonable risk.91 The chemical must be designated as “a highpriority substance” to fall under pause preemption.92 Additionally,
pause preemption will not occur when the EPA is “preparing risk
evaluations for the initial batch of 10 Work Plan chemical
substances,”93 the first ten chemicals selected in 2016 to be
evaluated under the new TSCA amendments.
85. See Denison, supra note 74, at 8.
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 2617(b); BURCHI, supra note 78, at 209; see also The Frank
R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act: Frequent Questions, EPA
(Oct.
24,
2016),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201610/documents/lautenberg_chemical_safety_for_the_21st_century_act_update_fa
qs_102416_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/TC3B-V8S3] [hereinafter Frequent Questions].
87. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(b)(1).
88. Id.
89. BURCHI, supra note 78, at 209.
90. See 15 U.S.C. § 2617(b)(1); BURCHI, supra note 78, at 209 (“[F]or example,
before the scope of a risk evaluation is defined or even after EPA determines in a
risk evaluation that a chemical presents an unreasonable risk but before a final
Section 6(a) rule based on the risk evaluation is issued.”).
91. BURCHI, supra note 78, at 209.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(1)(B)(i).
93. Frequent Questions, supra note 86 (“i.e., those that must be identified
under 6(b)(2)(A)” or 15 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(2)(A)). Under TSCA reform, the EPA
listed ten chemicals that would be evaluated first for potential risks to human
health and the environment. News Release, EPA, EPA Names First Chemicals
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While the implementation of LSCA came with strict
preemption provisions, the amendment also created exceptions to
preemption along with the preservation of certain state laws. In
regard to exceptions, LSCA does not preempt states from enacting
or enforcing rules, standards of performance, risk evaluation,
scientific assessment, or any other protection for public health or
the environment, if such enactment falls within one of four
categories: (1) adopted or authorized under a different federal law
or approved by another federal law,94 (2) implements reporting,
monitoring, or other information obligation for the chemicals not
required by the EPA under any other federal law, 95 (3) adopted
under state law which relates to water quality, air quality, or waste
treatment or disposal (subject to exceptions),96 or (4) is identical to
the EPA’s requirement.97 However, the exception involving
adopting regulations of chemicals under other state law imposes
three limitations: (1) state action cannot impose restriction of
manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, or use of a
chemical substance,98 and (2) addresses the same hazardous issues
as the EPA, but does not reach the same conclusion,99 or (3) would
cause a violation of the EPA’s action under Section 2604
(manufacturing and processing notices) or Section 2605
(prioritization, risk evaluation, and regulation of chemical
substances and mixtures).100
As noted, LSCA allows for the preservation of certain
preexisting state laws and regulations.101 Specifically, state efforts
taken prior to April 22, 2016, which prohibit or impede
“manufacturing, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or
disposal of a chemical substance” are not preempted.102
Additionally, any action taken pursuant to a state law that was in
for
Review
Under
New
TSCA
Legislation
(Nov.
29,
2016),
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-names-first-chemicalsreview-under-new-tsca-legislation_.html [https://perma.cc/EQ9N-93JC].
94. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(d)(1)(A)(i).
95. Id. at § 2617(d)(1)(A)(ii).
96. Id. at § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii).
97. Id. at § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iv).
98. Id. at § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii)(I).
99. Id. at § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii)(I)(aa).
100. Id. at § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(bb).
101. Id. at § 2617(e).
102. Id. at § 2617(e)(1)(A).
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effect on or prior to August 31, 2003, is not preempted.103 For
example, California’s Proposition 65, enacted in 1986,104 would be
protected from preemption because of its ratification date.
Another significant change is the waivers provision. 105 Prior
to the 2016 amendment, TSCA could waive federal preemption
under two situations: (1) the state or political subdivision
requirement would not unduly burden interstate commerce, or (2)
the state or political subdivision requirement would provide a
significantly higher degree of protection from risks described in the
section titled “Preemption.”106 Now, the waiver process has become
more complex, resulting in discretionary and non-discretionary
waivers.107
The discretionary provision permits the EPA to exempt a
statute, criminal penalty, or administrative action of a state or
political subdivision108 from preemption only if the federal
government makes several determinations: (1) compelling
conditions (e.g., protection of health and environment) exist to
grant the waiver;109 (2) complying with a proposed requirement of
a state or political subdivision would not “unduly burden interstate
commerce” in the manufacturing, distribution in commerce, or use
of a chemical substance;110 (3) complying would not result in a
violation of any applicable federal laws;111 and (4) the proposed
requirement of the state or political subdivision is consistent with
paramount science, supported by studies conducted with “sound
and objective practices,” and based on scientific evidence.112
With regard to the non-discretionary provision, the EPA is
directed to exempt from the pause preemption provision 113 a
statute or administrative action that relates to the effect of
exposure to chemical substances under conditions if the following
103. Id. at § 2617(e)(1)(B).
104. See Proposition 65, CAL. OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT,
https://oehha.ca.gov/proposition-65 [https://perma.cc/Z4KR-A7RV].
105. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(f); see also Envtl. Def. Fund, supra note 9, at 10.
106. S. 3149, 94th Cong. § 18(b)(1)–(2) (as passed by 2nd Session, 1976).
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 2617(f).
108. Id. at § 2617(f)(1).
109. Id. at § 2617(f)(1)(A).
110. Id. at § 2617(f)(1)(B).
111. Id. at § 2617(f)(1)(C).
112. Id. at § 2617(f)(1)(D)(i)–(iii).
113. Id. at § 2617(b).
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is determined: (1) complying with a proposed requirement would
not “unduly burden interstate commerce” with regard to
manufacturing, processing, distributing in commerce, or use of
chemical substance; (2) complying with a proposed requirement
would not cause a violation of a federal law, rule, or order; and (3)
the State or political subdivision has concerns regarding the
chemical substance or use of the substance based on peer-reviewed
science.114 Additionally, the EPA must waive pause preemption
when a statute or proposed administrative action, intending to
prohibit or restrict “the manufacture, processing, distribution in
commerce, or use of the chemical substance,” was enacted within
eighteen months after the EPA prioritized or published the scope
of the risk evaluation for the chemical substance.115
Determinations of discretionary and non-discretionary
waivers must be made no later than 180 days and 110 days,
respectively, after the application for a waiver is submitted. 116
When a decision by the EPA is not made within the 110 days for a
non-discretionary waiver, the federal statute or administrative
action that preempts states is considered non-existing, and the
state or political subdivision will automatically receive a waiver.117
C. Constitutionality of LSCA
Though many believe that LSCA corrected numerous
shortcomings of the original TSCA, overly strict preemptive
provisions have legislators and scholars concerned about the
states’ ability to regulate chemicals.118 Because of the country’s
increased concern over the restrictive nature of the new TSCA, an
examination of whether the statute delegates too much power to
the EPA is necessary.

114. Id. at § 2617(f)(2)(A)(i)-(iii).
115. Id. at § 2617(f)(2)(B).
116. Id. at § 2617(f)(3)(A)-(B).
117. See id. at § 2617(f)(4). If the State or political subdivision automatically
receives the waiver, the statute or administrative action will not be considered
preempted, forcing the EPA to abide by these deadlines or face consequences. Id.
at § 2617(f)(9)(A)-(B); see also BURCHI, supra note 78, at 214.
118. See generally David Goldston, Not ‘Til the Fat Lady Sings: TSCA’s Next
Act, 33 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 1, 1 (2016).
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Under the United States Constitution, Congress has the
exclusive right to exercise federal legislative power. 119 The
Constitution prohibits Congress from asserting such powers if it
would exceed the scope of Article I.120 Additionally, allocating
legislative authority to the executive or judicial branches of
government is prohibited under the nondelegation doctrine as such
concept is “rooted in the principle of separation of powers that
underlies our tripartite system of Government.”121 However, “[i]f
Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle
to . . . the person or body authorized . . . such legislative action is
not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”122 This exception
focuses on the degree of discretion Congress may entrust to the
executive branch’s federal regulators.123
The Supreme Court addressed the question of power delegated
to federal regulators in Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns.124 In
Whitman, the Supreme Court examined a provision of the Clean
Air Act (“CAA”), and addressed whether such provision violated
the nondelegation doctrine.125 The lower court found that the
statute provided too much discretion to the EPA to determine air
quality standards.126 The Supreme Court reversed and affirmed in
part finding that
[s]ection 109(b)(1) of the CAA, which to repeat we interpret as
requiring the EPA to set air quality standard at a level that is
“requisite”—that is, not lower than is necessary—to protect the
public health with an adequate margin of safety, fits comfortably
within the scope of discretion permitted by our precedent.127

119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives.”).
120. U.S. CONST. amend X. (“The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”).
121. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).
122. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
123. Id. at 407.
124. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
125. Id. at 463.
126. Id. at 472.
127. Id. at 475–76.
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Though agreeing with the majority’s overall outcome on the issue,
in his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas noted the
potential for violation of the nondelegation doctrine with regard to
congressional actions that appear to meet the intelligible doctrine
test.128 Justice Thomas further opined that he was “not convinced
that the intelligible principle doctrine serves to prevent all cessions
of legislative power . . . there are cases in which the principle is
intelligible and yet the significance of the delegated decision is
simply too great for the decision to be called anything other than
‘legislative.’”129 To address his potential concern, Justice Thomas
indicated that the Court should reexamine whether the “delegation
of jurisprudence. . .strayed too far from our Founders’
understanding of separation of powers” at some later date.130
Whitman is just one of many cases where the Supreme Court
upheld the delegation of power to federal regulators.131 Because of
cases like Whitman, it is unlikely courts would find justification to
invoke the nondelegation doctrine in the context of TSCA.132
Congress avoids the invocation of the nondelegation doctrine if,
instead of providing the EPA free reign to make law, it authorizes
the regulators to flesh out details of law;133 thus, in doing so,
Congress provides agencies vast discretionary authority.134
With the enactment of LSCA, Congress detailed its intent to
protect the environment and individuals from potentially harmful

128. Id. at 487.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 486; see, e.g., Dep’t. of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct.
1225, 1234 (2015) (failing to enforce nondelegation doctrine and remanding for
further consideration); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425-26 (1944)
(finding that the Administrator’s authority to fix prices was not an unauthorized
delegation of power); Nat’l Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–
26 (1943) (finding an intelligible principle authorizing regulation in public
interest, convenience, or necessity).
132. In its most recent review of delegated authority, the Supreme Court
once again failed to invoke the nondelegation doctrine. See Gundy v. United
States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). The most recent invocations of the nondelegation
doctrine occurred in the 1930s. See generally A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
429-30 (1935).
133. William K. Kelley, Justice Scalia, the Nondelegation Doctrine, and
Constitutional Argument, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2111 (2017).
134. Id. at 2110.
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manufactured chemicals.135 Additionally, as described in Section
B of Part III of this Note, Congress specified preemption guidelines
for the EPA to enforce upon the states. The preemption situations
include, when the EPA has made a new development of
information,136 when the EPA finds that chemical substances do
present an unreasonable risk,137 or when the EPA promulgates a
significant new use.138 As such, Congress did not empower the EPA
to establish these restrictive preemption provisions, but rather,
provided the guidelines for effectively limiting state action while
the federal government conducts examinations of harmful
chemicals. If Congress provided little guidance under the
preemption statute and the EPA began to invoke federal
preemption over states, such a situation might spark the Supreme
Court to revive the nondelegation doctrine, as the EPA would
effectively be establishing its own guidelines to minimize state
action.
However, while it appears that Congress did not violate the
nondelegation doctrine, it is still possible that the TSCA
preemption provisions impose a situation that is too great for
“anything other than [the] ‘legislat[ure].’”139 Environmental law is
an area typically regulated by the states, since states have the
potential to provide additional resources to combat emerging
problems.140 While the states traditionally have more regulatory
power with regard to environmental law, the nondelegation
doctrine’s lack of use to invalidate a statute since the 1900s141
suggests that Justice Thomas’ concern will not be addressed in the
context of TSCA.

135. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2629 (2018).
136. Id. at § 2617(a)(1)(A).
137. Id. at § 2617(a)(1)(B).
138. Id. at § 2617(a)(1)(C).
139. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
140. See Zellmer, supra note 7, at 98.
141. See generally A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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FEDERAL REGULATIONS OF PFAS UNDER
TSCA
A. The EPA’s Regulatory Scheme of PFAS

While assistance from the judicial branch seems unlikely in
providing a corrective solution to the preemption provisions, states
may still have the ability to regulate PFAS without violating
TSCA. Regulation of such chemicals will depend on whether the
EPA has taken sufficient measures to trigger the preemption
provisions. Specifically, the EPA designating chemicals to be a
“high-priority”142 or an “unreasonable risk”143 to society will
indicate preemption. Additionally, state statutes that require the
development of information that the EPA will have already
produced under current TSCA provisions will be preempted.144
States can also be preempted when a state regulatory action
contradicts a Significant New Use Rule (“SNUR”) promulgated by
the EPA.145 Thus the question becomes: are the EPA’s actions to
date enough to preempt state regulatory effort?
As previously addressed, PFAS have long been recognized as
chemicals found in manufactured goods, water supplies, and the
air. Because these chemicals were found to be harmful to both the
environment and individuals, the EPA has taken a variety of
regulatory actions to address the manufacturing of PFAS. 146
Beginning in 2002, the EPA published various SNURs, including
a requirement to notify the EPA before manufacturing or
importing certain PFAS which were part of the voluntary phase
out by 3M.147 Chemicals that were highly technical, and could not
be substituted, were allowed for limited use.148 That same year,
the EPA issued a SNUR for seventy-five PFAS, which required
manufacturers or importers to notify the EPA ninety days before
142. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(1)(B)(i).
143. Id. at § 2617(a)(1)(B).
144. Id. at § 2617(a)(1)(A).
145. Id. at § 2604(a).
146. Risk Management for Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS)
Under TSCA, EPA
(July 20, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/assessing-andmanaging-chemicals-under-tsca/risk-management-and-polyfluoroalkylsubstances-pfass [https://perma.cc/SW3J-EDFP].
147. Id.; see also Korzeniowski, supra note 24, at 6.
148. EPA, supra note 146.
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manufacturing or importing the specified PFAS. 149 Both SNURs
from 2002 required a review process by the EPA for any other use
of the specific PFAS listed.150
In 2006, the EPA invited eight leading companies in the PFAS
industry to join its stewardship program with two primary goals:
[1)] [to] commit to achieve, no later than 2010, a 95 percent
reduction, measured from a year 2000 baseline, in both facility
emissions to all media of perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), precursor
chemicals that can break down to PFOA, and related higher
homologue chemicals, and product content levels of these
chemicals. [2)] To commit to working toward elimination of these
chemicals from emissions and products by 2015.151

EPA progress reports reflect that all eight companies met the two
goals;152 some companies simply eliminated manufacturing uses of
the chemicals, while others left the PFAS industry all together.153
Finally, in 2013, the EPA issued another SNUR requiring all
companies that sold carpets to report uses of certain PFOA-related
chemicals if the chemicals were in the manufacturing process or if
the chemical would be used in imported carpets.154
With regard to current actions, in January 2015, the EPA
proposed a SNUR that would require manufacturers and importers
of PFOA and PFOA-related chemicals to notify the EPA at least
ninety days before starting or resuming use of these chemicals in

149. EPA, EPA’S PER- AND POLYFLUOROALKYL SUBSTANCES (PFAS) ACTION
PLAN 48 (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201902/documents/pfas_action_plan_021319_508compliant_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YJL2-L9KU].
150. See EPA, supra note 146.
151. Fact Sheet: 2010/2015 PFOA Stewardship Program, EPA (Aug. 9,
2018), https://www.epa.gov/assessing-and-managing-chemicals-under-tsca/factsheet-20102015-pfoa-stewardship-program#what
[https://perma.cc/ZWN7SDFE]. The companies that participated in the program included: Arkema,
Asahi, BASF Corporation (successor to Ciba), Clariant, Daikin, 3M/Dyneon,
DuPont, and Solvay Solexis. Id.
152. Id.; see also 2010/2015 PFOA Stewardship Program – 2014 Annual
Progress Reports, EPA (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/assessing-andmanaging-chemicals-under-tsca/20102015-pfoa-stewardship-program-2014annual-progress [https://perma.cc/ED89-NCQ4].
153. See EPA, supra note 151.
154. See EPA, supra note 146; see also EPA, supra note 149, at 48.
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products.155 Such notification would provide the EPA time to
evaluate the new use and take necessary actions to prohibit or
limit activity.156 Additionally, the EPA has enacted the New
Chemicals Program where the review of potential substitutes to
PFAS is conducted.157 This program requires testing consistent
with TSCA provisions158 and “restricts uses pending development
of an adequate understanding of the chemical’s fate and effects . . .
and requires that the substitutes not be contaminated significantly
with longer chain-length perfluorinated substances of concern.”159
Companies that manufacture a new chemical for non-exempt
commercial purposes must notify the EPA under this program.160
If the chemical is listed on the TSCA inventory, the substance is
not considered new, but rather existing;161 therefore, no
submission to the EPA would be necessary.162
Most recently, on February 14, 2019, the EPA released the
first ever nationwide PFAS Action Plan.163 One of the EPA’s major
proposals is to issue a regulatory determination which would
potentially result in a new Maximum Contaminant Level (“MCL”)
for PFOA and PFOS under the Safe Drinking Water Act.164
Additionally, the EPA plans to revisit the 2015 SNUR proposal
after considering public comments recently submitted, 165 as well
as designate PFOA and PFOS as hazardous substances.166 Though
155. EPA, supra note 146.
156. Id.
157. New Chemicals Program Review of Alternatives for PFOA and Related
Chemicals, EPA (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/assessing-and-managingchemicals-under-tsca/new-chemicals-program-review-alternatives-pfoa-and
[https://perma.cc/UJR2-2SJH].
158. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(e) (2018).
159. EPA, supra note 157.
160. Basic Information for the Review of New Chemicals, EPA (May 18,
2017),
https://www.epa.gov/reviewing-new-chemicals-under-toxic-substancescontrol-act-tsca/basic-information-review-new#new%20chemical
[https://perma.cc/PQ2H-UD34].
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. News Release, EPA, EPA Acting Administrator Announces First-Ever
Comprehensive Nationwide PFAS
Action Plan
(Feb. 14, 2019),
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-acting-administrator-announces-firstever-comprehensive-nationwide-pfas-action-plan [https://perma.cc/6TS6-WZFG].
164. See EPA, supra note 149, at 2.
165. Id. at 16.
166. Id. at 28.
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historic in nature and seemingly progressive at first glance, many
states believe the EPA’s Action Plan is not addressing the
continued concerns of PFAS at a swift enough pace.167 As a result,
states that desire a more proactive approach to combatting PFAS
must determine whether the EPA’s actions sufficiently trigger
preemption under TSCA.
B. Are states preempted from enacting regulations?
In light of the EPA’s regulatory practices with PFAS, states
face the question of whether they may regulate these chemicals or
whether federal action preempts their efforts. Based on the EPA’s
actions discussed in Section A of Part III of this Note, states may
very well be facing preemptive measures.
Of the two main categories, pause preemption appears to be
the most straightforward. In order to invoke pause preemption, the
EPA must initiate a risk evaluation process to appraise the safety
of an existing chemical.168 The first step in the risk evaluation
process is prioritizing an existing chemical.169 Though the EPA has
made several strides in regulating PFAS over the years, such
chemicals are on a should prioritize list. 170 In other words, the EPA
has not officially started the risk evaluation process that would
place states in a pause preemption period. Even if pause
preemption was initiated, some states could still regulate PFAS if

167. See Cecelia Smith-Schoenwalder, Frustrated by EPA, States Blaze
Ahead
on
PFAS,
E&E
NEWS
(Mar.
4,
2019),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060123043 [https://perma.cc/B9MH-Z8KZ]; see,
e.g., Wheeler’s Nationwide PFAS Action Plan Fails Communities, EARTHJUSTICE
(Feb. 14, 2019), https://earthjustice.org/news/press/2019/wheeler-s-nationwidepfas-action-plan-fails-communities [https://perma.cc/9U78-ZKYN].
168. See BURCHI, supra note 78, at 209.
169. Prioritizing Existing Chemicals for Risk Evaluation, EPA (last updated
Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.epa.gov/assessing-and-managing-chemicals-undertsca/prioritizing-existing-chemicals-risk-evaluation
[https://perma.cc/JZF7HBKF].
170. EPA, OFFICE OF CHEMICAL SAFETY AND POLLUTION PREVENTION, A
WORKING APPROACH FOR IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL CANDIDATE CHEMICALS FOR
PRIORITIZATION 1 (Sep. 27, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201809/documents/preprioritization_white_paper_9272018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PHM6-6QB9].
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a pre-existing law was in existence within a specified time period
(e.g., California).171
Overcoming the pause preemption hurdle is not as steep as the
three provisions listed under Section 18.172 The second portion of
Section 18, “Chemical substances found not to present an
unreasonable risk or restricted,”173 does not seem to be at issue
regarding PFAS. As mentioned, even though the EPA has taken
numerous steps to eliminate the manufacturing of some PFAS,
there is no indication that PFAS have been designated as posing
an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment, and
further, no formal risk evaluation has been undertaken.174
However, where states face the greatest hurdle lies within the
first portion of Section 18, “Development of Information.”175 Under
the first portion of Section 18, if “[a] statute or administrative
action that would require the ‘development of information’ that is
‘reasonably likely to produce the same information required’ under
a TSCA Section 4, 5, or 6 rule, consent agreement, or order,” such
state effort would be impermissible and preempted by federal
law.176 Because the first portion of Section 18 provides the
potential for states to face preemption via three different
provisions, an examination of all three is necessary.
First, while studies show that PFAS do pose harmful risks to
health and the environment, testing is still necessary to provide
definitive answers.177 As a result, current state laws requiring a
development of information would not “produce the same data”
under Section 4, as no such data pursuant to section 4 exists—the
federal government has not developed definitive statistics
regarding PFAS. Second, Section 5, which deals with SNURs, will

171. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(e)(1)(B) (2018) (noting actions taken pursuant to State
law prior to August 31, 2003, will not be preempted).
172. Id. at § 2617(a)(1).
173. Id. at § 2617(a)(1)(B).
174. See generally PFAS Laws and Regulations, EPA (July 30, 2018),
https://www.epa.gov/pfas/pfas-laws-and-regulations
[https://perma.cc/6D9M8SUN].
175. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A).
176. See BURCHI, supra note 78, at 208.
177. See EPA Pressed to Use ‘Discretionary’ TSCA Authority to Address
PFAS, CHEMICAL WATCH (Nov. 8, 2018), https://chemicalwatch.com/71712/epapressed-to-use-discretionary-tsca-authority-to-address-pfass#overlay-strip
[https://perma.cc/BPJ6-YJFP].
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be addressed more specifically in the following paragraph, but it
appears such section may be a problem. Third, Section 6 requires
the EPA to have taken risk management steps for states to be
preempted.178 The EPA has not prioritized PFAS yet,179 which
means the risk management process has yet to begin.180 As a
result, until the EPA designates PFAS as not an unreasonable risk
or promulgates a rule addressing the identified risks posed, states
are not preempted from enacting laws to regulate PFAS under
Section 6.
The third portion of Section 18, “Significant New Use,”181 is
the likely source for current state preemption. As discussed, the
EPA proposed a SNUR in 2015 that would require manufacturers
and importers of PFOA and PFOA-related chemicals to notify the
EPA at least ninety days before starting or resuming use of these
chemicals in products.182 This proposal has not been enacted yet
as the EPA is currently working on a re-proposal that requires both
compliance with requirements of TSCA and an analysis of public
commentary.183 If this proposal goes through, it could put certain
state regulation at risk of preemption. Specifically, states that
have initiated, or are in the process of enacting complete bans on
PFAS, could be in direct conflict with this SNUR if the EPA
permits certain types of PFAS to be reintroduced to the
manufacturing process.
Though the 2015 SNUR could be a problem, states currently
must examine prior SNURs, starting from 2002. SNURs ranging
from 2002 through 2013 require parties to notify the EPA for the
reasons of future manufacturing and future importing of certain
PFAS.184 However, these SNURs do not encompass every PFAS.
As such, states that enact complete bans on PFAS would likely face
preemption for the particular PFAS listed in the SNURs ranging

178. See Regulations of Chemicals Under Section 6(a) of the Toxic Substances
Control Act, EPA (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/assessing-and-managingchemicals-under-tsca/regulation-chemicals-under-section-6a-toxic-substances
[https://perma.cc/27AE-YHGP].
179. See generally EPA, supra note 170.
180. See EPA, supra note 169.
181. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(C) (2018).
182. See EPA, supra note 151.
183. See EPA, supra note 149, at 16.
184. See id. at 12.
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from 2002 through 2013185 because a complete ban would mean
those specified PFAS would not have the option for potential future
use; thus, a complete ban would be in direct conflict with the
SNURs. Under SNURs from 2002 to 2013, the EPA could allow
specified PFAS to be reintroduced into the manufacturing and
importation process. Therefore, it appears that states are partially
preempted—states likely cannot regulate PFAS listed in SNURs
ranging from 2002 through 2013.
V.

COMPARISON OF STATE LAW AND WHETHER
THERE SHOULD BE A CONCERN OF FACING
TSCA’S PREEMPTION PROVISIONS IN THE
FUTURE.

Although it appears the EPA has initiated enough regulation
to partially preempt governing actions, states should be mindful of
the possibility that preemption could eventually completely hinder
future regulatory efforts. As previously discussed, LSCA
implemented provisions that exempt certain state actions from
federal preemption, if such actions meet specific dates. 186 When
LSCA was enacted, consideration was given to certain states, such
as California, in order to preserve existing legislation that had
played important roles in chemical regulations. However, some
states, such as West Virginia, may face difficulties now and in the
future.
A. California
California’s Proposition 65, officially known as the Safe
Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, is one of a few
grandfathered state laws protected from TSCA preemption.187 The
185. See generally Perfluoroalkyl Sulfonates; Significant New Use Rule, 67
Fed. Reg. 11008–13 (Mar. 11, 2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 72854–67 (Dec. 9, 2002); 72 Fed.
Reg. 57222–35 (Oct. 9, 2007); 72 Fed. Reg. 62443-204 (Oct. 22, 2013).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(e)(1); see also What is Preempted and Not Preempted
Under the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, ENVTL.
DEF. FUND (2016), http://blogs.edf.org/health/files/2016/05/Preemption-underFRL21-5-23-16-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/PN3T-M2YD].
187. CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, NEW FEDERAL TOXICS LAW COULD
HAVE
FUTURE
IMPLICATIONS
FOR
STATE,
(Oct.
5,
2016),
https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/3504
[https://perma.cc/WS2X-KVZ3].
Massachusetts’ Toxic Use Reduction Act is another grandfathered legislation. See
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California law, in part, was enacted to safeguard the state’s
drinking water from chemicals known to have various negative
consequences, including birth and reproductive defects and
cancer.188 Because of the ubiquitous and persistent nature of
PFAS, California added two specific types, PFOS and PFOA, to
Proposition 65’s list of chemicals known to cause reproductive
toxicity.189 Since the chemicals were added to this list, “companies
doing business in California with 10 or more employees will be
required to provide a ‘clear and reasonable’ warning before
knowingly and intentionally exposing anyone to PFOA or
PFOS.”190 Even more pressure will fall on companies that are
unable to prove the need for these chemicals as they will face
damaging legal consequences. For instance, civil penalties for the
use of these substances can reach as high as $2,500 per violation
each day.191 Companies that use these PFAS regularly for
manufacturing purposes could be looking at upwards of a million
dollars for one year if only one violation occurs each day.192 Due to
the legal risks associated with PFAS in the manufacturing process,
businesses are recommended to examine the amount of PFAS
exposure their products encounter regularly and transition to
PFAS-free equipment and supplies.193
Even though it appears the EPA triggers preemption under
TSCA, various implementations from California to date will not be
disturbed. As previously addressed, California is safe from nearly
all preemption under TSCA as long as PFAS regulation is brought
generally, COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., MASSDEP TOXICS USE REDUCTION PROGRAM
(2019),
https://www.mass.gov/guides/massdep-toxics-use-reduction-program
[https://perma.cc/UUZ7-9J62].
188. See CAL. OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, supra note 104.
189. Perfluorooctane Sulfonate (PFOS), CAL. OFFICE OF ENVTL. HEALTH
HAZARD
ASSESSMENT
(2019),
https://oehha.ca.gov/proposition65/chemicals/perfluorooctane-sulfonate-pfos-and-its-salts
[https://perma.cc/D7AJ-976F]; Perfluorooctanoic Acid (PFOA), CAL. OFFICE OF
ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT (2019), https://oehha.ca.gov/proposition65/chemicals/perfluorooctanoic-acid-pfoa-and-its-salts [https://perma.cc/3UPM45VG].
190. Jeffery Dintzer & Nathaniel Johnson, INSIGHT: PFAS Liability Is
Coming to California, BLOOMBERG ENV’T & ENERGY (Oct. 31, 2018, 7:01 AM),
https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/insight-pfasliability-is-coming-to-california [https://perma.cc/EX3Y-EZQL].
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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under Proposition 65. For instance, California properly noted that
PFOS and PFOA chemicals were added to the Proposition 65 list
because of the known reproductive defects. Proposition 65 was
specifically enacted to regulate chemicals that have reproductive
consequences194 and therefore, any regulation of at least PFOS and
PFOA would fall within the scope of the legislative act. Since
California enacted this legislation prior to August 31, 2003,195 the
State has created a safe haven for most future regulations
involving PFAS. However, if California wants to regulate PFAS
other than PFOA and PFOS, the State should individually list
these additional chemicals under Proposition 65.
B. West Virginia
While California is merely one of numerous states already
addressing PFAS contamination,196 other states, which might
enact new state regulations or rely on current state regulations to
combat PFAS, may be unable to avoid preemption under TSCA.
Specifically, West Virginia could fall within the category of
unprotected states susceptible to preemption. Typically, West
Virginia is not known for being a green state, and has few
implemented environmental protections.197 Fewer protections
might leave West Virginia vulnerable to TSCA’s strict preemption
provisions.
Following the EPA’s lifetime advisory warning of certain
PFAS, West Virginia’s Bureau for Public Health published an
announcement regarding health concerns.198 Other than the
publication addressing the EPA’s advisory, West Virginia has yet
to employ corrective solutions to PFAS problems, even though the
194. See CAL. OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, supra note 104.
195. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(e)(1)(B) (2018).
196. See Bill Tracker, SAFER STATES, http://www.saferstates.com/billtracker/ [https://perma.cc/B8LQ-X5NR]. New York has proposed legislation to ban
the manufacture and sale of food packaging containing PFAS. See States in the
Lead: New York, SAFER STS., http://www.saferstates.com/states-in-the-lead/newyork/ [https://perma.cc/XFZ6-CSYW].
197. See John S Kiernan, 2018’s Greenest States, WALLETHUB (Apr. 15, 2019),
https://wallethub.com/edu/greenest-states/11987/ [https://perma.cc/KBY7-LSYJ].
198. See W. VA. BUREAU FOR PUBLIC HEALTH, PERFLUORINATED COMPOUNDS
DRINKING
WATER
HEALTH
ADVISORY
(2016),
https://www.wvdhhr.org/oehs/documents/BPH_pfoa%20pfos_FL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/87PU-C5NX].
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state is one of the most affected by PFAS contamination.199 As
such, it would appear that if West Virginia were to initiate a state
effort addressing PFAS, it could be preempted. 200 The complicated
issue to consider is whether West Virginia would be able to
regulate PFAS under an existing law enacted prior to August 31,
2003.201 The answer is uncertain. Assuming that West Virginia
relies on its Hazardous Waste Management Act,202 the state could
address the management of chemicals and possible hazardous
products which might be of concern.203 However, while the statute
purports to maintain public health and safety to the environment,
it appears to focus more on the management of hazardous wastes
or chemicals, with minimal attention devoted to the manufacturing
process.204
Given the broad nature of the statute, it is difficult to provide
a definitive answer as to whether the state’s reliance on the
Hazardous Waste Management Act is sufficient to withstand
preemption; the question becomes, are the words “manufacturing”
and “management” synonymous? If manufacturing and
management are indistinguishable, or if the statute is deemed
sufficient with regard to manufacturing regulation, West Virginia
could likely avoid preemption under its Hazardous Waste
Management Act so long as PFAS regulation is listed under the
Act, similar to California’s listing of certain PFAS under
Proposition 65. Although, since West Virginia has not addressed
PFAS concerns, it could be reasonably found that the Hazardous
Waste Management Act is not meant for the regulation of such
chemicals. Consequently, West Virginia might be a preempted
state without an escape avenue.

199. See generally Brittany Patterson, EPA Pledges to Limit Public Exposure
to Chemicals Like C8, W. VA. PUBLIC BROAD. (May 22, 2018),
https://www.wvpublic.org/post/epa-pledges-limit-public-exposure-chemicalsc8#stream/0[https://perma.cc/E2X8-YK7G].
200. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(e)(1)(A).
201. Id. at § 2617(e)(1)(B).
202. W. VA. CODE § 22-18-2 (2019).
203. Id. at § 22-18-2(b)(2).
204. Id. at § 22-18-2(b)(1).
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CORRECTIVE SOLUTIONS TO IMPENDING
PREEMPTION
A. TSCA Exceptions and Waivers

As previously addressed in Part II of this Note, LSCA carved
out protections from preemption in the form of exceptions and
waivers. Unfortunately, neither appears to provide adequate
solutions to the restrictive nature of TSCA. As such, states should
be aware of nuances surrounding these provisions.
Under TSCA, states are not preempted: (1) if a regulation is
adopted pursuant to another federal law; (2) if a regulation
provides for monitoring or reporting not required by the EPA; or
(3) if a regulation is adopted pursuant to a state water, air, or waste
treatment law.205 However, option three is limited to the extent
that it does not impose restrictions on manufacturing, processing,
distribution in commerce, or use of a chemical substance, and
either (a) addresses the same hazardous issues as the EPA, but
does not reach the same conclusion, or (b) would cause the EPA to
violate other portions of the statute.206
Option one and two do not require much attention or analysis.
TSCA is the main federal regulation concerning the manufacturing
and distribution of certain chemicals. As such, it is unlikely other
federal manufacturing laws would provide stricter provisions for
PFAS that can compete with state actions looking to completely
ban PFAS. Similarly, with option two, it is unlikely a state will
require monitoring different from the EPA, as the EPA tends to
look to states for guidance in order to understand health effects
associated with hazardous chemicals.207 As such, whatever
standards states establish will likely be on point with the federal
government once the EPA initiates additional PFAS protections.
Option three poses a solution to regulating chemicals, but may
also prove unavailing. Regulating through other means (i.e., water
laws), discussed in the next section, would be a positive solution to

205. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(d)(1)(A)(i)–(iii).
206. Id. at § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)–(bb).
207. See, e.g., News Release, EPA, EPA Seeks Public Input on Draft Toxicity
Assessments
for
PFAS
Chemicals
(Nov.
14,
2018),
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-seeks-public-input-draft-toxicityassessments-pfas-chemicals [https://perma.cc/V35Z-DDZ9].
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preemption. However, under the TSCA provision, it would mean
adopting water, air, or waste disposal treatment laws that would
effectively reduce the manufacturing of PFAS.208 Regulating
through other state laws is challenging as the TSCA provision has
limitations, particularly that the state air, water, or waste disposal
law cannot restrict manufacturing.209
If states are facing preemption under TSCA, the overarching
issue must be the manufacturing with or manufacturing of a
certain chemical, as the purpose of TSCA’s enactment was to
“prevent unreasonable risks of injury to health or the environment
associated with the manufacture, processing, distribution in
commerce, use, or disposal of chemicals substances.”210
Consequently, it would not matter that states rely on other laws to
reduce the manufacturing of PFAS, because those laws would
violate 15 U.S.C. § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii)(I). Even if an argument could
be made that the manufacturing itself would not be affected,
regulations under other laws would still likely violate 15 U.S.C.
§ 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii)(I) as (1) the processing of a product and (2) the
use of the chemical substance would be restricted.211 Additionally,
if states were to rely on other authority (water, air, or waste
disposal), it could not restrict distribution in commerce.
Distribution in commerce means “trade, traffic, transportation, or
other commerce (1) between a place in a State and any place
outside of such State, or (2) which affects trade, traffic,
transportation, or commerce between a place in a State and any
place outside of such State.”212 In essence, if states rely on other
laws, which would likely be more restrictive on PFAS use,
distribution in commerce would clearly be affected as those states
would probably not allow any products manufactured with PFAS
to be distributed within state borders. Therefore, the exceptions

208. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii) (2018).
209. Id. at § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii)(I).
210. Markell, supra note 54, at 338 (quoting S. REP. No. 94-698, at 1 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4491).
211. See
generally
Toxic
Chemicals:
PFAS,
SAFER
STS.,
http://www.saferstates.com/toxic-chemicals/pfas/ [https://perma.cc/LKL8-QMB3].
212. 40 C.F.R. § 720.3 (2016).
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provision of TSCA is not an effective solution to avoiding
preemptive measures.213
In addition to exceptions, states have the ability to obtain a
waiver. Waivers, too, are ineffective solutions for states because
both discretionary and non-discretionary waivers cannot impose
an undue burden on interstate commerce.214 In United States v.
Lopez, the Supreme Court found that interstate commerce is
affected by commercial activity.215 Unlike Lopez, where the mere
possession of a handgun was found to not affect interstate
commerce,216 it would be difficult to argue that providing states
with waivers, which limit the manufacturing of PFAS, would not
have some sort of effect on interstate commerce. PFAS are used to
manufacture various products, such as stain repellants217 and
carpets.218 These are items meant to be distributed in commerce.
If states want to reduce or eliminate the use of PFAS through a
waiver from the federal government, manufacturing would be
greatly limited and could result in a product not making its way to
the market. As a result, a waiver under TSCA, which in the context
of PFAS would allow states to reduce or limit use of the chemicals
during the manufacturing process, could impose an undue burden
on interstate commerce.
B. Regulation through Water Provisions
Because the exceptions and waivers under TSCA do not
appear as workable escapes from preemption, states should focus
less on regulating the manufacturing of PFAS and emphasize
corrective solutions to limit the levels of these chemicals in water
supplies. As addressed briefly in the preceding section, TSCA

213. As addressed in Part IV of this Note, the EPA has not officially begun
the risk management process, thus the second prong of 15 U.S.C.
§ 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii) is not currently at issue, and therefore, will not be addressed
in this note. See id. at § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa).
214. Id. at § 2617(f)(1)–(2).
215. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
216. Id. at 567.
217. See LYONS, supra note 18, at 109 (Scotchgard is an example of a wellknown stain repellant that once contained PFOS, a type of PFAS).
218. See CAL. DEP’T OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL, DISCUSSION DRAFT:
PRODUCT – CHEMICAL PROFILE FOR PERFLUOROALKYL AND POLYFLUOROALKYL
SUBSTANCES (PFASS) IN CARPETS AND RUGS 4–5 (2018).
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exceptions pose an interesting solution to regulating chemicals:
regulation through water laws. The problem again with regulating
chemicals through other means is that such regulation cannot limit
manufacturing, processing, distribution in commerce, use or
disposal of chemicals substances.219 A method of bypassing those
restrictions would be to not regulate manufacturing, but rather use
state water laws to regulate water systems and operators. Water
systems and operators have no impact on the manufacturing of
PFAS, but rather, can assist in the purification process of water
supplies contaminated with PFAS.
Additionally, the EPA has established very limited water
guidelines, which means states have flexibility when it comes to
regulating water systems and operators, so long as the regulations
do not contradict section 15 U.S.C. § 2617(d)(1)(A). Currently, the
EPA has only provided a health advisory maximum contamination
level of seventy parts per trillion.220 However, EPA health
advisories are both non-enforceable and solely provide technical
guidance to states and public health officials with regard to
potential health effects.221 Some states have adopted the EPA’s
advisory222 while others, such as New Jersey, have taken more
aggressive measures to ensure the safety of its citizens and the
environment.223
States like New York are at the forefront of combatting PFAS,
and such actions may provide guidance to other states.
Particularly, in 2016, Governor Cuomo created the Water Quality
219. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii)(I).
220. Drinking Water Health Advisories for PFOA and PFOS, EPA (last
updated Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.epa.gov/ground-water-and-drinkingwater/drinking-water-health-advisories-pfoa-and-pfos [https://perma.cc/GG5S2MLY].
221. Drinking Water Contaminate Human Health Effects Information, EPA
(Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.epa.gov/dwstandardsregulations/drinking-watercontaminant-human-health-effects-information [https://perma.cc/7PQR-QZDT].
222. See Cole Alder, Analysis of state-by-state differences in PFAS regulation,
NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY: SOC. SCI. ENVTL. HEALTH RES. INST. (Oct. 2, 2018),
https://pfasproject.com/2018/10/02/analysis-of-state-by-state-differences-in-pfasregulation/ [https://perma.cc/G5V9-FGFX] (noting states that have adopted the
EPA’s suggested standard).
223. Drinking Water Facts: Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) in
Drinking
Water,
N.J.
DEP’T
OF
HEALTH
2
(2017),
https://www.nj.gov/health/ceohs/documents/pfas_drinking%20water.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HRX9-LZ69] (New Jersey has enforced standards that do not
allow PFAS to exceed 14 ppt for drinking water).

35

174

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

Rapid Response Team to investigate water contamination across
New York and to take remedial actions to address drinking water
issues across the state.224 In 2017, Governor Cuomo enacted the
Clean Water Infrastructure Act, which put $2.5 billion towards
enhancing New York’s efforts.225 The Act will provide support to
help communities upgrade drinking water and wastewater
infrastructures with modern filtration systems and connect
contaminated private water wells to regulated public systems.226
Such measures can hopefully sieve out PFAS or at least minimize
the amount of PFAS getting through the filtration systems. While
New York’s actions appear costly, it is a possible option to avoid
preemption under TSCA. These regulations do not appear to imply
any sort of limitation on manufacturing and would therefore likely
be immune from a preemption challenge.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The ubiquitous nature of PFAS has resulted in country-wide
contamination. States are currently taking steps to minimize
human exposure and reduce the quantity of these chemicals found
in the environment. However, even though the federal government
continues to drag its feet with enforceable PFAS standards,
preemption has likely been triggered with the implementation of
SNURs ranging from 2002 through 2013. As such, states should
act now with regard to unregulated PFAS or hope there is some
state provision to rely on, since the exceptions and waivers sections
of TSCA are not ideal solutions. This Note does not recommend an
amendment to TSCA, but rather, provides awareness of the
preemption provisions and the resulting effect on PFAS
manufacturing regulation.
While reducing the manufacturing use of these harmful
chemicals provides a fast solution to the contamination problem,
states must be realistic about federal government assistance given
224. Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS), N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL.
CONSERVATION,
https://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/108831.html
[https://perma.cc/5L9P-8Z4Z].
225. Id.
226. Id.; see also New York State’s Water Quality Rapid Response Team
Continues Actions to Address Water Contamination Statewide, N.Y. DEP’T OF
ENVTL. CONSERVATION (Jan 31, 2017), https://www.dec.ny.gov/press/109114.html
[https://perma.cc/SR5N-WK4S].
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its lack of initiative. Regulating water systems and operators is
another effective solution to decreasing the level of exposure to
humans and the environment. Through an adoption of
preventative procedures, states can take the “other fork of the
road—the one ‘less traveled’”227 to effectively begin remediation of
an inadequately addressed problem, and ultimately combat the
continued spread of these harmful, omnipresent chemicals.

227. CARSON, supra note 1, at 277.
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